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Abstract: 
 No invention by nature is inherently disruptive, instead, it must be used disruptively. This 
is especially true when advanced technologies intersect with standards of industry practice. Con-
flicts between nations being no exception. In war, those principles and standards of practice are 
governed by a complex set of normative behaviors and signed agreements both reflected in the 
law of armed conflict and customary international law.  
The principle of proportionality will be impacted by a new, advanced technology that im-
plements quantum computing, artificial intelligence, and machine learning for purposes of ad-
vanced decision-making and increased computing speed and accuracy. This technological icono-
clasm may disrupt the mental assurance requirements that drives decision-makers’ targeting 
analysis for purposes of accomplishing military objectives, and the destructive results that follow 
such decisions.  This is due to the opaqueness of such technologies, the battlefield—the cyber 
domain, as well as a lack of clarity in legal nomenclature regarding the principle itself.  
This article examines such impacts and analyzes how mental assurance requirements 
may not be met if there is a misunderstanding as to how and why a technology makes decisions; 
and if there is a misunderstanding of the level of damage caused by such technology. It also ex-
amines legal interpretations and past uses of advanced technologies in the cyber domain, and 
how they can provide a way forward in crafting useful solutions to this approaching reality.  
 Consequently, the opaqueness of such technology must be reconciled with new governing 
principles. This article concludes that a more proactive approach in understanding technological 
development, clarity in legal terms, and responsible decision-making cycles ensure use of such 
technologies on a legally sufficient basis.  
  
“Accidents happen. That’s what everyone says. 
But in a quantum universe there are no such 
things as accidents, only possibilities and 
probabilities folded into existence by percep-
tion.” –Dr. Manhattan 
“When you change the way you look at things, 
the things you look at change.”-Max Planck  
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I. Introduction 
A. Hypothetical   
 Let’s picture a scenario where: An operational planning team convenes a targeting board 
to conduct analysis for an attack on adversary command-and-control systems. Due to the adver-
sary’s technological sophistication and its integrated national economy, the enemy’s communica-
tion infrastructure has allowed current success in coordinating its movement of forces on the bat-
tlefield. The targeting board concludes that without this coordination, the adversary could not 
operate successfully—it is a critical vulnerability.  A decision is made to use a new weapon sys1 -
tem that combines artificial intelligence (AI) , machine learning (ML),  and quantum computing 2 3
(QC)  technologies and methodologies to disable enemy communication systems that allow this 4
coordination. This enemy communication system is comingled via internet infrastructure with 
the country’s civilian communication network serving as its underlying foundation.  The new 
platform quickly decides that disabling the entire network system of the country—including 
those aspects outside of this conflict zone—will achieve a decisive decision leading to an end to 
the conflict. It promptly uses quantum computing methodologies to access, decrypt, disable, and 
adversely re-encrypt the entire nation-state’s communication system, rendering it inoperable by 
said-named nation state and depriving the nation state’s citizens of their national and political 
economy for undetermined period of time. The infrastructure also has suffered physical damage 
as there is no ability to conduct troubleshooting or maintenance for its recovery.   
B. Framework and Disruption  
  “[N]o invention is innately ‘disruptive’…it must be used disruptively,”  as noted by 5
Russian chestmaster, Garry Kasparov.  This is especially true when advanced technologies inter-
sect with principles and standards of practice of an industry. Conflict between nations is no ex-
ception. In war, those principles and standards of practice are governed by a complex set of nor-
 See U.S. MARINE CORPS, PUB. NO. 1, WARFIGHTING  47, (1997) (“[A] vulnerability that, if exploited, will do the 1
most significant damage to the enemy’s ability to resist…”).
 See infra Section II. C.2
 Id.  3
 See infra Section II. A. 4
 GARRY KASPAROV, DEEP THINKING: WHERE MACHINE INTELLIGENCE ENDS AND HUMAN CREATIVITY BEGINS 5
152 (Hachette Book Group 2017).
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mative behavior and signed agreements reflected in the law of armed conflict and customary in-
ternational law.  This article addresses the current disruption—a combination of artificial intelli6 -
gence and machine learning as a means of executing quantum computing, using advanced algo-
rithms, large data sets, and the underlying scientific principles of the universe for purposes of 
advanced decision making capacity and extraordinary computational power and speed—and its 
impact on the law of armed conflict principle of proportionality within cyberspace. Proportional-
ity stands for the proposition that the goals of a strike and damage to civilians and civilian ob-
jects, must be balanced.  This technological iconoclasm may impact this principle, specifically, 7
this disruption will have an impact on proportionality’s nuanced mental assurance requirements 
for decision-makers which govern actions within a conflict—jus in bellum —such as the permis8 -
sible destructive results that follow those targeting decisions.  This is an unfortunate circum-
stance as international law discourse is currently grappling with developing en vogue armed con-
flict rules and frameworks for application in cyberspace.  That discourse primarily focuses on 9
what occurs on a strategic level.  The hypothetical demonstrates that this change in technology 10
 See generally NATIONAL SECURITY LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & 6
SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK ch. 1-4 (Major Dustin Kouba et al. eds., 2018).  
 See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 7
Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Ship-wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; 
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; 
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287; [hereinafter Geneva Conventions].  See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) arts. 51(5)(b), 
57(2)(a), 57(2)(b), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol]. 
 See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL, ¶¶ 1.11 (2016) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR MAN.]. (Providing 8
that Jus in bellum concerns the law during the conduct of war while the Jus ad Bellum concerns the rules of resort-
ing to force or going to war).
 See generally TALLINN MAN. ON THE INT’L LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE, 1.0 (Michael N. Schmitt, ed., 9
Cambridge Univ. Press 2013); TALLINN MAN. 2.0 ON THE INT’L LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. 
Schmitt, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2017).
 See generally HERBERT LIN & AMY ZEGART., BYTES, BOMBS, AND SPIES: THE STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS OF OF10 -
FENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS (Brooking Inst. Press 2018).  
!5
Coming to a Battlefield Near You: Quantum Computing, Artificial Intelligence, & Machine Learning’s Impact on Proportionality
will cause decisions made at a tactical level of an armed conflict quickly make their presence 
known to strategic level considerations.  11
 The rules of jus in bellum—in short—generally hold that targets may be acquired and de-
stroyed if criteria built from a “puzzle formed by hundreds of individual pieces of international 
law [agreements and customary practices by action] and domestic law” are met.  According to 12
international sources such as Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva Conventions af-
ter World War II and their Additional Protocols thereafter; international and domestic nation-
court decisions; ancient customary law; U.S. domestic sources  such as the United States Code, 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, federal agency regulation, case law, and military department 
field manuals; and even works from academia; a set of general targeting principles has been de-
veloped to conduct military targeting operations.  The interdependent principles of military ne13 -
cessity; distinction; proportionality; unnecessary suffering (humanity); and honor, ensure that 14
decisions and actions executed in warfare are conducted on a battlefield in a relatively humane 
and legally sufficient manner.   15
This article deals mainly with Proportionality. This principle ensures legitimacy to con-
duct hostilities, as well as trust and confidence between nations that each will follow signed 
agreements and normative behavior by requiring decision-makers to go through a process bal-
ancing incidental civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure and the military advantage to 
 In military nomenclature, there are usually three levels of war (sometimes four). These levels are war are: strate11 -
gic, operational or campaign, and tactical. The Strategic level which focus activities directly on national policy ob-
jectives (not to be confused with ‘national strategy’ which uses all elements of a national power to obtain 
objectives). The Operational or Campaign level which links these national policy objectives to the tactical level by 
deciding where, when, and under what conditions to conduct armed conflict. The Tactical level focuses on particular 
missions that accomplish combat objectives which should lead to operational and strategic success. See U.S MARINE 
CORPS, supra note 1, at 26-32.
 Maj. Aaron L. Jackson and Colonel Kristine D. Kuenzli, Something To Believe In: Aligning The Principle Of 12
Honor With The Modern Battlefield, 6 Nat’l Sec. L.J.  35, 41 (2018) (“[LOAC] is not a singular work of art, but 
rather, a puzzle formed by hundreds of individual pieces of international and domestic law.”).  
 Id.13
 See e.g.  DOD LAW OF WAR MAN., supra note 8, at ¶¶ 2.1-2.6.3.2; See also KASPAROV, supra Note 5, at Ch. II. 14
Both sources cite a variety of references, cases, and treaties. This author has chosen to use these particular references 
as sources of U.S. interpretation of these general principles. The author believes that these sources capture the prin-
ciples in a manner conducive to this article’s discussion. Other sources, including those of allied parties such as the 
United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada may differ. That discussion is beyond the scope of this article.  
 See id. at ¶ 1.3.4.15
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be achieved.   The U.S. has codified this principle as a matter of policy within its Department of 16
Defense Law of War Manual (DoD Manual) which frames U.S. interpretations of the in-
ternational law of armed conflict.  17
 Questions are raised as to the point in which these advanced technologies—AI, ML, and 
QC—are implemented on the battlefield cross the line of legal departure from that which is con-
sistent with the above principle. Considering the technological sophistication involved with QC, 
AI, and ML, can the current standard be met by decision-makers if there is no true understanding 
of the technology, and how and why it chooses to make its decisions? Considering many coun-
tries do not and cannot bifurcate their communications or cyber networks from that of civilian 
infrastructure, how do we preclude asymmetric impacts on the civilian population for an elongat-
ed period of time? Are there limitations that can be put into place to check the decision-making 
process where an artificial intelligence agent using machine learning methodologies carries with 
it the power of QC?  Are new rules required given the technological iconoclasms present, or has 
a new rule already emerged from past-practice and legal interpretation? Although these are com-
plicated questions, if appropriate interpretation and recommendations can be developed, these 
impacts may be minimized, and answers may be developed to provide clarity to the situation. 
Thus, allowing use of advanced technologies such as QC in warfare in a responsible and accept-
able manner. 
 This article seeks to analyze the impact QC will have on Proportionality. First, the discus-
sion will focus on QC, AI, and ML typology, development trends, technical impacts, and target-
ing within the cyber domain. Second, the article will discuss the rule of proportionality, in gener-
al, as well as doctrinal interpretations and academic comment. Next, it provides real-world ex-
amples of proportionality’s application in armed conflict. Third, the article will apply the princi-
ple to the introductory hypothetical. Lastly, the article will provide normative recommendations 
and concluding remarks. The aim of this article is, hopefully, to encourage further analysis, dis-
cussion, and development of legal academia regarding this increasingly important and complex 
technology and its relation to national security law and the law of armed conflict.  
 See Geneva Conventions, supra note 7.16
 DOD LAW OF WAR MAN., supra note 8, at ¶¶ 2.4.17
!7
Coming to a Battlefield Near You: Quantum Computing, Artificial Intelligence, & Machine Learning’s Impact on Proportionality
II. Quantum Computing, AI and ML: typology, development trends, impacts on national 
security, and the “Black Box”  
  In short, quantum and its mechanics—which provide the foundation of QC—is about 
“information, probabilities, and observables, and how they relate to each other.”  The properties, 18
designs, and potentials of QC that accomplish this relationship will ultimately lead to the devel-
opment of platforms capable of vast computing power and speed, and the rethinking of security 
measures used to protect information and other traditional military applications. AI and ML exe-
cute QC capabilities through the ability to mimic human critical thinking and complex decision 
making by training on massive data sets.  This facilitates the creation of algorithms to better 19
tackle complex problem sets, giving a computing system the ability to learn from its experience 
and improve performance.  In turn, these impacts will force a reevaluation of the rules that gov20 -
ern targeting in warfare.  
A. Typology  
1. Quantum Computing  
 Quantum computing (QC) is the process by which computers use principles of quantum 
physics, mechanics, and information science for increased computational power and speed.  21
Quantum physics, mechanics, and information science, allow computers to perform simultaneous 
calculations by measuring the physical photons, electrons, or atom nuclei of data.  This is possi22 -
ble due to the continuous physical nature of photons that can contain values that exists in more 
than one state at once, making contributions in both states for computational power and speed.  23
Their existence in multiple states, and contributions to different but simultaneous calculations to 
 SCOTT AARONSON, QUANTUM COMPUTING SINCE DEMOCRITUS 110 (Cambridge Univ. PresS 2013) (“From [my] 18
perspective, [quantum mechanics] it’s about information and probabilities and observables, and how they relate to 
each other. [It] is what you would inevitably come up with if you started with probability theory, and then said, let’s 
try to generalize it so that the numbers we used to call ‘probabilities’ can be negative numbers.”).
 See infra Section II. C.19
 Id. 20
 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NAT’L SCI. AND TECH. COUNCIL, ADVANCING QUANTUM INFORMATION 21
SCIENCE: NATIONAL CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES (2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/
files/images/Quantum_Info_Sci_Report_2016_07_22%20final.pdf.; see also Dr. Arthur Herman & Idalia Friedson, 
Quantum Computing: How to Address the National Security Risk, HUDSON INST. at Aug. 2018, at 2-9. 
 Herman & Friedson, supra note 21, at 5; see Nayef Al-Rodhan, Quantum Computing and Global Security, GLOB22 -
AL POL’Y J., (2015).
 See Herman & Friedson, supra note 21.23
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accomplish a collective goal, are real examples of the utility of science-fiction theories that at-
tempt to prove parallel existence, in reference to Dr. Manhattan’s quote above.   24
 Quantum computing accomplishes this feat through the use of information known as 
qubits.  Qubits encapsulate the existence of data in more than one state through information sci25 -
ence methodologies.  In classical computing, information exists in individual electronic signals 26
or voltages known a bits; these bits can only carry values of zero or one (0, 1), but not both.  27
This forces classical computers to use algorithms for computing in the bits limited binary state.  28
Because qubits are physical in nature, its existence and properties are continuous. It can be har-
nessed in a two-dimensional form known as superposition, where information exists in multiple 
states at once through a process in which these superimposed qubits are intimately correlated and 
connected (even over a certain distance), known as entanglement; or, measured by process of 
noise known as squeezing.   29
 The physical nature of each photon and the harnessing and measurement of its continuous 
state reveals qubits as probabilities which distribute value at the time it is measured.  Thus, in 30
theory, these qubits carry an infinite number of values of these “zeros and ones” or combinations 
thereof at all times until each measurement is conducted (0, 1, [00], [01], [10]...etc.).  As this 31
methodology and process of harnessing and measuring information is perfected, encoding of in-
formation in those qubits occurs; and the serious implications of surpassing and replacing classi-
cal computing which uses binary states is evident.  
2. Impacts and Implications on Computing Speed and Computation Power  
 Quantum computing’s largest impact—in terms of weaponeering and warfare—will be its 
difference from classical computing speed and encryption scheme power. Classical computing 
 See, e.g., AMIT HAGAR, QUANTUM COMPUTING § 4.1.1 (Stanford Encyclopedia of Phil. rev. ed. 2019), http://pla24 -
to.stanford.edu/entries/qt-quantcomp/.
 See Herman & Friedson, supra note 21. 25
 Id.  26
 Id.27
 Id.28
 Id. at § 2; see also infra APPENDIX I of this article for more information.29
 Herman & Friedson, supra note 21, at §§ 1 and 2. 30
 Id.31
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uses binary states of logic of “ones and zeros” to create linear coding.  In terms of speed, classi32 -
cal computing processing power involves a concept called “Moore’s law,” which postulated that 
processor speed and overall processing power for computers would double every one and one-
half years.  This has driven development of computer chip fabrications that hold the transistors 33
which allow bits of those “ones and zeros” to operate to become smaller and more powerful for 
economic-demand and hardware reasons.  Current levels of classical computing speed may have 34
reached a plateau in keeping up with this demand, due to the inability to make chips smaller than 
current levels that can carry the processing power and speed needed, thus encouraging a search 
for faster and more powerful computing processes.   35
 Quantum computing changes this because of its  ability to factor all possibilities of its 
existing state simultaneously, at once.  As opposed to only stringing together binary states of 36
logic of “ones and zeros,” the above discussed states of superposition and entanglement allow 
multiple strings of logic at once and in multiples of current binary code by a factor of two-times 
the qubit.  This means that current computing speeds will significantly surpass conventional 37
computing methods due to sheer performance of binary operation.  
 In terms of encryption schemes that protect computing information, currently the best 
classical computing uses large mathematical operations known as public-key cryptology that de-
mands access split between parties to unlock information hidden within the data.  Security pro38 -
tocols of large integers are used to scramble information as unreadable until this large string of 
integers is solved.  This is an asymmetric two-staged process by which one party generates a 39
private key to decrypt information that can only be unlocked by a public key containing the an-
swer to the integer.  The answer is generally available to a trusted party who is authorized to 40
 See Al- Rodhan, supra note 22.32
 Id. 33
 Id.34
 Id. 35
 See id.; see also Herman & Friedson, supra note 21, at 5.  36
 See KEITH CRANE, ET AL., ASSESSMENT OF THE FUTURE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF QUANTUM INFORMATION SCI37 -
ENCE 43-44 (IDA Science & Tech. Inst. 2017) [hereinafter Crane, et al.].
 Id. at 33-34; see also Herman & Friedson, supra note 21, at 4-6. 38
 Crane, et al., supra note 37, at 33-34.39
 Id. 40
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unlock the problem.  This process is reliable because even with the fastest available convention41 -
al computing power attempting to forcibly break this encryption method by factoring the integer, 
it could take years—which is an unreasonable time period if one is attempting to intercept com-
munication during, for example, a current military operation in need of the information contained 
within the data.   42
 Quantum computing’s increased power due to qubits contains the ability to dramatically 
reduce the time needed to factor the integers of current encryption, thus rendering moot conven-
tional security protocols for protecting information.  Quantum computing would be able to po43 -
tentially find the solution to the integer by simultaneously generating answers for every possible 
scenario, as well as their alternatives at increasing speed.  From the description of QC, it is easy 44
to see how current computing power and encryption schemes which rely on classical computing 
will be impacted.  
3. New Approaches to Computing and Security 
 The impacts of QC will change the way in which computing power and encryption 
methodologies are implemented. Because of the vast power and speed QC will bring to the table, 
current computing methods and encryption methodology will implement QC. QC will offer more 
state’s space to store information and better encryption schemes.  45
 As to computational power, Peter Shor’s discovery of the  algorithm which can factor 
large numbers by using quantum mechanics to perform faster calculations exceeding classical 
methods, and the subsequent demonstration by AT & T labs that it can actually perform first or-
der logic operations, has led to effort to develop quantum computers that can someday replace 
classical computers.  It is currently understood that quantum phenomena can be harnessed in 46
qubits to perform computing operations. The blending with information science—which allows 
efficient encoding and transmission of information— ultimately renders development of these 
 Id. 41
 Id. 42
 Id. 43
 Id. 44
 Id. 45
 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 21, at 2.46
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computers all the more real.  Massively complex calculations performed at increasingly fast 47
rates will produce faster and more powerful computers for private, commercial, or public-mili-
tary use that will lead to new computing power, dubbed “Quantum Supremacy.”  Quantum Su48 -
premacy is where a quantum computer surpasses a classical one for general computing purposes 
by solving problems no classical computers can solve.  Many companies and nation-states are in 49
a race to develop these computers, which will be discussed further below.   50
 In the 2018 report, Quantum Computing: How to Address the National Security Risk, Dr. 
Arthur Herman and Idalia Friedson list a number of primary systems to illustrate real ap-
plications of quantum computing technology.  Two of these systems are applicable for purposes 51
of this discussion: (1) quantum annealers and (2) quantum computers.  The first type of comput52 -
ing involves a quantum annealer. Annealers are used to solve a multitude of optimization prob-
lems by performing calculations that do not disturb the states of qubits.  This machine takes 53
samples and measurements to measure the natural tendency of the energy represented—including 
that of the qubits as they compute.  Certain types of metals are currently being used to imple54 -
ment this process and companies such as D-Wave Systems Inc. assert breakthroughs of using 
“thousands” of qubits for purposes of pattern recognition detection software used by machine 
learning tools, image analysis, and cyber security.  55
 Id. 47
 See Herman & Friedson, supra note 21, at 4-8; see also Crane, et. al., supra note 37, at 33-34, 43-44.  48
 See Herman & Friedson, supra note 21, at 7.49
 See id. at 13-19; see also, e.g., Patricia M. Figliola, Quantum Information Science: Applications, Global Research 50
and Development, and Policy Considerations, CONG. RES. SER. No. R45409, 1-3 (2018).
 Herman & Friedson, supra note 21, at 8.51
 Id. 52
 Id.; see also Al-Rodhan, supra note 22, at 2.53
 Al-Rodhan, supra note 22, at 2.54
 Id.; see also Dr. Steve Adachi, Near-Term Applications of Quantum Annealing, Int’l Workshop on Quantum An55 -
nealing and its Applications in Science and Science and Industry (QuAASI), (Jul. 27, 2016), http://www.fz-
juelich.de/ias/jsc/EN/Expertise/Workshops/Conferences/QUAASI16/Programme/Talks/quaasi16-adachi.pdf?
__blob=publicationFile. “D-Wave’s quantum computer leverages quantum dynamics to accelerate and enable new 
methods for solving discrete optimization, sampling, material science, and machine learning problems. It uses a 
process called quantum annealing that harnesses the natural tendency of real-world quantum systems to find low-
energy states. If an optimization problem is analogous to a landscape of peaks and valleys, each coordinate repre-
sents a possible solution and its elevation represents its energy. The best solution is that with the lowest energy cor-
responding to the lowest point in the deepest valley in the landscape.” D-WAVE SYSTEMS, About Us, https://www.d-
wavesys.com/our-company/meet-d-wave (last visited Dec. 26, 2019).
!12
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 The second system is a quantum computer.  This system requires the entanglement of 56
qubits in a superimposed state to transmit information contained in data faster than conventional 
computers.  Again, this occurs by computing algorithms that no conventional computer could 57
compute or by computing current algorithms faster than the best current super computers.  Cur58 -
rently companies such as Google, IBM, Microsoft, and China’s Alibaba, have devoted resources 
to developing scalable quantum computers and had minimal success at quantum computation 
that transmits information held in qubits.  This will have real-world applications in every do59 -
main in which computers are currently operated. Progress is slow, however, as this computing 
method requires semiconductor chip circuits that can quickly overheat during the process. Cur-
rent research focuses on cooling methods for this process or alternative methods for continued 
development of quantum computers.  60
 Specific applications in terms of national security and warfare involve radar, sensing, 
GPS, and encryption security.  In short, sensing will assist in protecting information by ‘sens61 -
ing’ the disturbance of protected data’s physical state.  This is quite different from factoring its 
security protocol integer or detecting stealthy military hardware that disturbs qubits entangled 
states, using GPS to exploit more accurate measurements photons, and encryption by using more 
power factorization of integer security protocols.  Using this methodology will create better secu-
rity for its own quantum computing systems.  This is why nation-states as well as private indus62 -
try is keenly focused on the development of this technology.  
 See Herman & Friedson, supra note 21, at 8.56
 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 21, at 6.57
 Id.  58
 Id.; see also Elsa B. Kania & John K. Costello, Quantum Hegemony? China’s Ambitions and the Challenge to 59
U.S. Innovation Leadership, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY ¶¶ 3-5, (Sept. 2018), https://www.cnas.org/
publications/reports/quantum-hegemony (last visited January 3, 2019).
 Kania & Costello, supra note 59, at 4; See also Herman & Friedson, supra note 21, at 8.  60
 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 21, at 4-7; Herman & Friedson, supra note 21, at 4-14; see also 61
Kania & Costello, supra note 59, at 4-26.
 Herman & Friedson, supra note 21, at 11, 13. Specifically, for security purposes, QC could use quantum random-62
number generators (QRNG) for truly random encryption keys based upon naturally occurring cosmic energy mea-
surements; post-quantum cryptography using quantum resistant algorithms (QRAs) by using difficult mathematical 
equations and large[r] integers than those currently used by classical computers; and quantum communication net-
works based on the physical state of individual particles held in qubits. 
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B. Development Trends  
 In terms of industry and national security strategy, this disruption has garnered the atten-
tion of the U.S. government. A string of commissioned studies, orders, and policy assessments 
regarding this issue have recently surfaced.  For example, former President Barack Obama 63
signed Executive Order 13702  in 2015, which provides that the U.S. government will “maxi64 -
mize the benefits of high-performance computing research, development, and deployment”—
now known as a derivative of quantum computing (QC).  Moreover, the National Science and 65
Technology Council produced a joint report which detailed the impacts of QC will have on cer-
tain fields of science such as high-performing computing, sensing, meteorology, and 
simulation.  It further states that the government must take a “coherent, all of government ap66 -
proach” to sustain and developing technology based upon Quantum Information Science (QIS) to 
manage its impact on these fields of study.   Lastly, the Government Accountability Office has 67
issued a report on U.S. federal agency support of scientific and technological innovation that 
stems from enhanced technology such as quantum mechanics and quantum computing.  The 68
GAO report, Considerations for Maintaining U.S. Competitiveness in Quantum Computing, Syn-
thetic Biology, and Other Potentially Transformational Research, details current Department of 
Defense initiatives, ultimately concluding that federal agencies should take a “strategic ap-
proach” to support QC by creating interagency groups and define roles and responsibilities to 
accomplish common outcomes. This would ensure agencies maintain U.S. competitiveness and 
dominance in innovative technologies.  
 Other countries are also quickly developing QC and QIS capabilities.  China, the United 69
Kingdom, Canada, and the European Union have all committed research and development in-
 See, e.g., Figliola, supra note 50.63
 Exec. Order No. 13,702, 80 Fed. Reg. 46,177 (July 29, 2015).64
 Id. 65
 See generally EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 21.66
 Id. at 1.67
 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-656, CONSIDERATIONS FOR MAINTAINING U.S. 68
COMPETITIVENESS IN QUANTUM COMPUTING, SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY, AND OTHER POTENTIALLY TRANSFORMATION-
AL RESEARCH AREAS (Sept. 2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/694748.pdf.
 Id. at 1 (“The United States is considered a world leader in many sciences and technology areas, but other coun69 -
tries, such as China, are also making increased investments in research [for quantum computing and quantum infor-
mation science]. Increased competition from these countries has led some experts and others to express concern…”). 
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vestments to explore this technology and its real-world applications.  Out of these countries, 70
China appears to be the leader and main competitor of the U.S., especially in its development of 
QC and QIS capabilities in combination with artificial intelligence and machine learning for mil-
itary applications.  This demonstrates an international “arms race” for the next advanced mili71 -
tary capability to gain an edge on the battlefield that moots competitors’ current technological 
capabilities.  
C. Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and the Impact on National Security and 
Armed Conflict 
The current technology which makes QC and QIS so dangerous would be their combina-
tion with artificial intelligence and machine learning. Artificial intelligence can be generally de-
fined as a computer science program’s ability to solve complex problems through a process that 
mimics human critical thinking; it must be able to receive information, critically analyze infor-
mation, act on such information, and store that decision-making process for future application.  72
Machine learning adds another layer of intelligence to artificial intelligence by allowing it to 
train on massive pre-programmed data sets that are matched via algorithms through a variety of 
methods such as adversarial competition, micromanagement, and other corrective measures.  73
Machine learning enables predictive models that may serve artificial intelligence in making ra-
tional decisions in a variety of environments.  This ability to “think” and act critically in a given 74
situation, as well as the ability to improve such behavior through programming and experience, 
make applications of QC and QIS all the more pressing for military powers.   
From a national security and armed conflict standpoint, QC and QIS may give certain 
countries strategic advantages in intelligence and warfighting. Combined with artificial intelli-
 Id.70
 Id.; see also Kania & Costello, supra note 59. 71
 See Salahudin Ali, Cybersecurity Support of Insider Threat Operations: DoD Regulation and Constitutional 72
Compliance, 30 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. (forthcoming 2019); see also Appendix II of this article for more informa-
tion.  
 Ali, Cybersecurity Support of Insider Threat Operations, supra note 72; see also APPENDIX III of this article for 73
more information.
 Id. 74
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gence and machine learning capabilities, this advantage has been called battlefield singularity.  75
Battlefield singularity connotes the concept that artificial intelligence will surpass human deci-
sion-making capability and weaponize available information to analyze and act faster than an 
opponent during conflict to achieve a decisive decision on the battlefield.  This could involve 76
syncing commanders, their platforms such as unmanned aerial vehicles, and their artificial intel-
ligence tools that use machine learning for a coordinated operation on a traditional battlefield. In 
an intelligence environment, this could involve the deciphering of sensitive communications that 
are ongoing or stored, or the detection of infiltration of adversary eavesdropping attempts with 
ease. This would allow advanced situational awareness of adversary action and intentions. Essen-
tially, the mass accumulation of data and ability to analyze and learn from the data, and the push 
of analytics to tools and platforms in the battlefield puts an adversary at a critical disadvantage.  
This singularity combined with the potentially massive computing power QC brings to 
the table changes the dynamic by given a competitive edge on the battlefield. However, without 
effective control or insight into the these tools decision-making processes, that advantage could 
become a liability in regards to what the competitive edge is supposed to achieve in a conflict.  
D. The “Black Box”  
 The issue that may arise from this singularity of combined QC, AI and ML, is an under-
standing of how and why a platform that uses them makes decisions. This is known in AI 
nomenclature as “Black Box” AI.  “Black Box” AI is generally considered “the inability to fully 77
understand an AI’s decision-making process and an inability to predict the AI’s decisions or out-
puts.”  It can be classified as strong or weak—“strong” being a complete inability figure out 78
 See Elsa Kania, Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China’s Future Military 75
Power, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/battle-
field-singularity-artificial-intelligence-military-revolution-and-chinas-future-military-power.
 Id. 76
 See Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box And The Failure Of Intent And Causation, 31 HARV. J. 77
L. & TECH. 890, 905 (2018).  
 Id. (“Generally, the [Black Box Problem] can be defined as an inability to fully understand an [AI’s] decision-78
making process and the inability to predict the [AI’s] decisions or outputs.”). Outputs are those actions or decisions 
taken by the AI agent based on information perceived and experience. See STUART RUSSEL & PETER NORVIG, ARTI-
FICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH 1-59 (3d ed. 2016).
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why and how an AI does what it does, and “weak” being the ability to probe for some limited 
idea in the AI’s decision-making process—but common to both is the opaqueness to humans.   79
 The function AI and ML tools used to perform are opaque because of the complexities 
involved in the algorithms. Countless artificial neurons, deep neural networks, and interconnect-
edness of networks, resemble and function like a human-brain that learns from experience.  The 80
large data-sets and training methods produce a level of intuitiveness that pulls aggregate knowl-
edge from individual neurons in large networks, each neuron performs the function of weighing 
and calculating individual forms of data to produced better algorithms.  These algorithms, in-81
turn, are used to produced better performance for a tool or platform’s assigned goals.  To at82 -
tempt to understand these complex layers and dimensions would be like trying to solve the se-
crets of neural science related to the human brain, an ongoing process. One would have to calcu-
late and know why a certain weight is given to a gradient or piece of data as it travels through 
layers of neural networks.  
 Moreover, algorithms can also be used to seek and find hidden variables and pattern-
recognition.  Methodologies include classifying types of behaviors, objects, and other data 83
points by using separation points.  An AI platform uses ML algorithms to create these separa84 -
tions points to pick-out patterns, variables, and common characteristics of data.   Depending on 85
what separation points are used to identify these patterns and variables, it can become impossible 
to figure out exactly which separation points are being used.  For example, a commander may 86
program a platform or tool to identify enemy soldiers in a conflict zone. The platform or tool 
uses the data point of enemy flags attached to green camouflage to distinguish enemy soldiers 
from civilians in a conflict-zone. This is an easy observation to make, but would possibly be 
prone to too many anomalies—maybe green camouflage is a fashionable item in the said-named 
 See Bathaee, supra note 77, at 905-6.79
 Id. at 897-906. 80
 Id. 81
 Id. 82
 Id.83
 Id. at 904 figs. 3 & 4.84
 Id. at 905.85
 Id. 86
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country. The algorithm can be further refined to limit this data point to only those who also 
where camouflage blouses and trousers, and so on and so forth. Eventually the platform or tool 
will start to characterize and classify those it identifies as threats based on this criteria (of course 
with outliers) using separations points that are no longer observable (so far, those other than 
green camouflage, blouses, trousers, etc.) to humans.    87
 This situation is exacerbated with the addition of QC, any difficulty in attempts at under-
standing “Black Box” AI would be increased as increased speed and different foundations for 
algorithms—quantum information science and quantum mechanics—would be used. Under-
standing of this technology is vital to the standards and criteria provided by the law of armed 
conflict (LOAC) principle of proportionality, because that analysis requires a certain level of 
knowledge regarding expected casualties and damage, as well as how a decision contributes to 
the military mission.  If a commander is unable to predict the results of her actions nor under88 -
stand why her weapon system makes decisions, she may not be able to form the requisite level of 
mental assurance to conduct an attack.   89
III.Cyberspace Domain and Targeting 
The tools of QC, artificial intelligence, and machine learning will be used in and through 
cyberspace. There are various definitions of cyberspace, but the DoD defines it as “[a] global 
domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent networks of infor-
mation technology infrastructures and resident data, including the internet, telecommunications 
networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.”  This domain is trifur90 -
cated into layers which consist of the physical layer, the logical layer, and the cyber-persona lay-
er.  Each layer is distinct upon its characteristics but related into how they interact with each 91
 Id. 87
 See Additional Protocol, supra note 7, at art. 51(5)(b). 88
 Id. 89
 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-12, CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS, at GL-4 (June 2018) [hereinafter JOINT PUB. 90
3-12]; see also William Gibson, Neuromancer (1989) (containing one of the first ever definitions of cyberspace, 
although it is science-fiction) (“A graphical representation of data abstracted from the banks of every computer in 
the human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the non-space of the mind, clusters and constel-
lations of data.”); see also Richard A. Clarke & Robert K. Knake, The Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Se-
curity and What to Do About It (2010) (“Cyberspace is all of the computer networks in the world and everything 
they connect and control.”). What can be gathered from these myriad of definitions is that cyberspace involves com-
puters/devices, networks that connect them, and users of such computers/devices and networks. 
 JOINT PUB. 3-12, supra note 90, at I-2 to I-5.91
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other in use. The physical layer represents devices and infrastructure that is represented in hard-
ware such as storage components, computers frames, or data centers.  The logical layer consists 92
of networks and software that related to another, which is represented by IP addresses, codes, 
websites script, or metadata.  The cyber-persona layer represents the abstraction of data that de93 -
scribes users or uses of the logical layer; this could be individual users, automated systems, or 
organizational accounts.   All three layers will be impacted by QC, many nations conduct cyber94 -
space operations as a means of warfare, including the Department of Defense (DoD).  95
Within these layers lay important entities, objects, and gatherings of people (networks in 
the cyber-persona layer) that if impacted or destroyed, contribute to a military mission. These are 
known as targets; a target is considered an entity or object that functionally operates as a threat 
for engagement or other action.  Targeting is the process of “selecting and prioritizing targets 96
and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capa-
bilities.”  Determining and prioritizing targets requires a cyclical process of nominating, priori97 -
tizing, developing (through intelligence and preparatory actions) and deciding on which targets 
to engage, employing appropriate capabilities to accomplish a mission’s intent on the target, as-
signing forces to accomplish the task, and assessing the impact of such targeting.  This cyclical 98
process begins and ends with the commander’s intent and desired effects she seeks as an out-
come that contributes to her overall mission, tying her actions to that of the overall military cam-
paign.  99
In cyberspace, this is conducted by using a process of accessing, enumerating, prioritiz-
ing, and taking action that exploits some vulnerability of one or all three layers of a cyberspace 
 Id. at I-3. 92
 Id. at I-4.93
 Id. 94
 See DOD LAW OF WAR MAN., supra note 8 at 1012 (“Cyberspace may be understood to be those operations that 95
involve the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through 
cyberspace.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF PUB. 3-60, DOD DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 231 (Feb. 2019).96
 Id. at 232. 97
 Maj Steven J. Smart, Joint Targeting in Cyberspace, AIR & SPACE POWER J., 69-70 (2011) (The author pulls 98
his analysis from JP 3-60, but this publication is unavailable to the public); see also JOINT TARGETING SCHOOL, 
JOINT TARGETING SCHOOL STUDENT GUIDE (2017), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/training/jts/
jts_studentguide.pdf?ver=2017-12-29-171316-067 (last visited, Mar. 28, 2019). 
 Id. 99
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target—this most likely occurs within the larger steps of development and capabilities matching 
during a  traditional targeting cycle analysis.  Accessing includes the ability to take advantage 100
of a system and deliver a desired effect; enumerating includes the process of mapping and identi-
fying key aspects of a system; prioritizing includes a command decision of ranking which targets 
will best achieve a mission’s intent; and exploiting includes the process of delivering impacts—
through payloads such as malware, etc.—to the system that achieve a mission’s intent.  Target101 -
ing is conducted based upon relevancy in achieving a commander’s objectives overall, not for the 
sake of availability.  Types of targeting may be classified as easy or difficult; and remote or 102
close; regardless, a commander must weigh all of these considerations during a targeting process 
cycle.   103
The assistance of QC, AI, and ML methodologies can quickly complicate an already nu-
anced process of targeting analysis. Factual issues of why a particular target is developed and 
why a certain effect has been chosen can be easily lost if decisions within this cycle are delegated 
or replaced by tools meant for assistance during this targeting process such as AI, ML, and QC. 
This may be a contribution of the aforementioned “Black Box” AI problem—the complex 
process of deep neural networks, algorithms, and optimization of pattern recognition—that make 
it hard for humans to visualize and understand how and why a AI tool using ML methodologies 
makes decision.  Although cyberspace brings with it these sets of differences from traditional 104
targeting during an armed conflict, targeting must adhere to international law and DoD policy 
that govern targeting decision making process and development.  This means that regardless of 105
 JP 3-12, supra note 90, at IV-8 to -9; see also Salahudin Ali, The Bloody Nose: 10 U.S.C. § 395, 6 NAT’L SEC. 100
L. J. 127 (2018) (forthcoming).
 JP 3-12, supra note 90, at IV-8 to -9; see also Smart, supra note 98, at 69-70. (The author pulls his analysis from 101
JP 3-60, but the current version of JP 3-60 is unavailable to the public).
 JP 3-12, supra note 90, at IV- 9 (“The focus [of targeting] is on creating effects that accomplish targeting-related 102
tasks and objectives, not on using a particular cyberspace capability simply because it is available.”).
 See Ali, The Bloody Nose, supra note 100.103
 Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box And The Failure Of Intent And Causation, 31 HARV. J. L. & 104
TECH. 890, 897-905 (2018) (“The complexity of these countless neurons and their interconnections makes it diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to determine precisely how decisions or predictions are being made. [A]lgorithms can also 
create a black-box problem because they process and optimize numerous variables at once by finding geometric 
patterns in higher-dimensional, mathematically defined spaces.”).
 See, e.g., DOD LAW OF WAR MAN., supra note 8, at 1013-1024; see JP-3-12, supra note 90, at IV-8; see Smart, 105
supra note 98, at 66-67.
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the tools used in cyberspace, there is no exception or exemption available that will permit target-
ing in this domain without looking to international law targeting principles to intelligently ana-
lyze the legality and impact of their uses. A failure to do so may result in a serious violation giv-
en the unknown inputs that are often associated with cyber domain targeting and advanced tech-
nologies. 
IV. Impact on the Principle of Proportionality 
 The discussion above has thus far focused on typology, its relationship with current cyber 
targeting, its impact on the national security and intelligence landscape, and the means of deliv-
ery for QC capabilities. The legal principles of LOAC are how we view this impact and its legal 
implications during an armed conflict. 
  First, it is important to note what this analysis is not about avoiding confusion. First, it is 
not about whether it is legal to use QC or QIS in warfare altogether. That process is conducted in 
accordance with international law and U.S. policy to ensure a technology or weapon has the ca-
pability to distinguish between civilian and military objects, and does not cause superfluous in-
jury or unnecessary suffering (in terms of pain to an individual actor) as designed.  Second, we 106
are not concerned with a debate as to whether these principles are correct or are truly governing 
in a conflict—the U.S. has accepted these principles through signed agreement or as customary 
international law, and has mandated compliance with them through Department of Defense Di-
rective 2311.01E .  Third, the remaining principles of military objective, distinction, and honor 107
may be met due to nation-state communication systems being dual-use for military and civilian 
purposes.  Fourth, we are not concerned with whether an “armed conflict” truly exists or not. 108
These principles apply to situations where parties intend to conduct kinetic hostilities or where 
parties are conducting kinetic hostilities; the existence of a shooting-war in our hypothetical 
would appear to meet this criterion.  Finally, for the sake of analysis, we are to assume an “at109 -
 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Respecting the 106
Laws And Customs of War on Land, art. 23(e), Oct. 18, 1907, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247 [hereinafter Hague Con-
vention (IV)] (“[It] is especially forbidden [to] employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary 
suffering.”).
 See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE ON DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM No. 2311.01E ¶¶ 4-5 (2011). 107
 See, e.g., DOD LAW OF WAR MAN., supra note 8, at §§ 5.6.1.2.108
 Id. at § 3.4.  109
!21
Coming to a Battlefield Near You: Quantum Computing, Artificial Intelligence, & Machine Learning’s Impact on Proportionality
tack” has occurred which qualifies the use of LOAC principle analysis due to the physical dam-
age the system has suffered due to the attack—the absence of an attack means that no targeting 
analysis needs be completed.  Here, we are concerned with its effects on targets once used, and 110
how it affects decision-making under an existing acceptable legal regime. The accepted interde-
pendent principle this article is concerned with is Proportionality. This principle ensures the im-
pacts of warfare through target selection are limited and are conducted in a manner acceptable to 
the international community.   111
 Proportionality has been adopted by the international community as customary law and 
by acceptance through signed agreements.  The general principle found in U.N. Geneva Con112 -
vention, Article 51 of Additional Protocol I (1977) is the controlling document for signature par-
ties.  The U.S. has adopted this principle in its DoD Manual as a matter of policy to facilitate 113
consistency in legal interpretation and to “address the law that is applicable to the [U.S.].”  114
Originally published in 2015 and updated in 2016, the DoD Manual serves as official U.S. inter-
pretation of international law but cautions that it does not serve as a “substitute for the careful 
practice of law.”  This means that—although a guide for interpretation of international law—115
each instance during an armed conflict must analyze LOAC principles dependent upon a specific 
circumstance, as opposed to using the DoD Manual as a broad brush to reach an intended con-
clusion.  
 As with any practice of law, the general legal rule serves only as a starting point. In-
terpretations are elastic and new rules can and must be created to carry-on with the times. In this 
 Col. Gary Brown, USAF (Ret.) and Maj. Isreal King, USAF, An Airman’s Guide to Cyber Power: Cyberlaw and 110
Policy, AIR UNIVERSITY (Jul. 6, 2017), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CyberCollege/Portal/Article/Article/
1238536/cyberlaw-and-policy/; see TALLINN MAN. 2.0 ON THE INT’L LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE, supra 
note 9, at 106-07 (There must be an “attack” to warrant LOAC analysis, if not, then the principles do not apply. A 
current standard is a test developed by Prof. Michael N. Schmitt, where he describes an attack in the sense of jus in 
bellum as having a tendency to result in damage or destruction to objects or injury or death to people).   
 See Geneva Conventions, supra note 7.111
 Id. 112
 Id.  113
 DOD LAW OF WAR MAN., supra note 8, at 1 (“This [manual] seeks to address the law of war that is applicable to 114
the United States, including treaties to which the United States is a Party, and applicable customary international 
law.”) (emphasis added); see also DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 107, at ¶ 5.1.3.
 Id. 115
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new, murky world of QC, AI, and ML, interpretation of international law may present interpreta-
tions consistent with established legal policy.  
A.  The Principle of Proportionality 
      The principle of proportionality is defined by the limitations it places on the incidental 
but expected damage to property, loss of life, and injury to civilian populations caught between 
the conduct of hostilities.  It generally holds that these incidental results of targeting must be 116
reasonable and cannot be “excessive” in relation to the direct and concrete military advantage 
gained by striking a target—even if the action is justified, the relevant language provides that it is 
prohibited to conduct:  
[A]n attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.  117
Moreover, this rule is repeated in Article 57 (b) of Additional Protocol I: 
[A]n attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent 
that…attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combina-
tion thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated.  118
        This principle requires unpacking as many of its terms are vague and left to subjective 
judgement. The relevant elements from this principle are: 1. there must be an attack; 2. civilian 
loss of life, injury, or damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof is expected; 3. there is 
a concrete military advantage anticipated for the action; 4. the expected civilian loss of life, in-
jury, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, is excessive compared to such con-
crete and direct military advantage. If elements one, two, and four are met, the attack must be 
cancelled or suspended, likewise if just element three fails, the attack must also be cancelled.  119
It is important to note that this process of unpacking is significant; this is highlighted by cyber 
 Additional Protocol, supra note 7, at art. 51(5)(b); see also DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 107, at ¶ 4-5; see also 116
DOD LAW OF WAR MAN., supra note 8, at 60. 
 Additional Protocol, supra note 7, at art. 51(5)(b).117
 Id. at art. 57(2)(b). 118
 Id. at art. 51(5)(b).119
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operations scholar and practitioner Commander Peter Pascucci, United States Navy, JAGC, 
where he states, “[u]nderscoring the importance of the proportionality analysis, Article 57 (2) (a) 
(iii) repeats [for a third time] the standard and precludes those planning, launching or executing 
attacks from proceeding with the attack if it becomes apparent that the attack would violate the 
principle.”   120
         An attack is evident when kinetic actions result in some form of damage, destruction, in-
jury, or death (for purposes of this article, we assume both parties are in an open armed conflict 
and have inflicted kinetic impacts on each other), the hypothetical above indicates at least some 
form of damage is expected on the physical layer of a communication network.  Likewise, the 121
hypothetical demonstrates that the military advantage to be achieved is to stop the adversary-par-
ty’s ability to effectively command and control its forces; thus a concrete objective exists.  122
Thus points one and three are satisfied. However, points two and four become murky when ap-
plied to the hypothetical.  
         Attacks aren’t expected to avoid loss of life, damage, or injury to civilians and civilian 
infrastructure altogether, but they must not be excessive or unreasonable.  Excessiveness and 123
reasonableness are not defined in international law, but may be defined by the level of directness 
and concreteness of a targeting action.  Thus, a subjective balancing test, based upon available 124
battlefield data which estimates physical damage, potential civilian casualties, and risk to sensi-
tive infrastructure, drives the decision-making process of a commander wishing to execute a tar-
geted strike.  In other words, the commander must be reasonably well-informed under the cir125 -
cumstances based on the information available to her that excessive civilian casualties and dam-
 See Peter Pascucci, CDR, US Navy, JAGC, Distinction and Proportionality in Cyberwar: Virtual Problems with 120
a Real Solution, 26 MINN. J. INT’L L. 419, 445 (2017). 
 DOD LAW OF WAR MAN., supra note 8, at ¶ 3.4. 121
 See supra Section I. A.122
 DOD LAW OF WAR MAN., supra note 8, at § 2.4. n. 67. 123
 Id.124
 Id. 125
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age will not result from her action.   Due to this subjective burden placed on commanders to 126
determine whether a particular military action results unreasonable or excessive damage, com-
manders maintain the responsibility to accurately assess such information available to them, as 
well as always act in good-faith based on such information.  This information is available 127
through collateral damage estimates, battlefield intelligence, and other information gathering 
methods.  
Reasonableness may be shown if the commander can explain—based upon an assessment 
of such information—the importance of a target and how it contributes to the overall mission and 
that the incidental damage is not expected to outweigh such advantage.  Thus, the burden may 128
be overcome as long as feasible precautions are taken during the planning and targeting analysis 
cycle of a strike to limit harms to civilians and those not involved in an example, a commander 
may determine time, location, and weaponeering to accomplish this task and comply with this 
principle.  129
This is not to say that a decision to strike must be perfect one, if a “military advantage”—
those tactical gains that can also be linked to the overall armed conflict strategy—can be demon-
strated, commanders will not be subject to second-guessing regarding their operational decisions 
where critics may benefit from Monday morning quarterbacking.  This is because “extensive” 130
damage is not the standard, only “excessiveness.”  Civilian use or civilian elements tied to a 131
target will not exempt it from military action—true, this situation may produce a moral dilemma 
for the decision-maker given the fact that human life is measured against tactical and strategic 
 GARY SOLIS, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 303 (2d. ed., Cambridge Univ. 126
Press 2016) (quoting Prosecutor v. Galic, IT-98-29, ¶ 58 (2003)) (“In determining whether an attack was proportion-
ate it is necessary to examine whether a reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances of the actual perpetra-
tor, making use of the information available to him or her, could have expected excessive civilian casualties to result 
from the attack.”)
 Id. at 195-96.127
 Id. at 244-43. A note of caution is warranted here. Many commanders make the argument that “force protection” 128
serves as part of the analysis. This may result in picking the most destructive, but inaccurate, method for an attack. 
Force protection is not part of the proportionally test, thus a commander cannot claim an expectation that excessive 
damage is not expected if they intentionally choose a means that promote such a prospect. See Solis, supra note 126, 
at 304-05; see also, Additional Protocol, supra note 7, at art. 51(5)(b).
 See NATIONAL SECURITY LAW DEPARTMENT, supra note 6, at 11.  See also infra Section IV.129
 Id. 130
 Additional Protocol, supra note 7, at art. 51(5)(b).131
!25
Coming to a Battlefield Near You: Quantum Computing, Artificial Intelligence, & Machine Learning’s Impact on Proportionality
gains—but the proportionality rule is elastic enough to promote responsible decision-making in 
such a situation.  In other words, if a commander can foresee the contribution a successful 132
strike may have on the conflict as a whole, she may choose to execute the strike in-light of the 
balancing test and harm estimates she conducts with her staff.   133
This balancing test of proportionality is tricky when it comes to the cyberspace domain in 
which the commander seeks to use an AI, ML, and QC weapon platform. For instance, the line is 
not concisely drawn where the results of strike end, nor is it clear where the AI and ML platform 
that uses QC will draw the line of what it considers the commander’s target as a military advan-
tage based upon her balancing analysis. The task has been left to entity doctrine development and 
academia to find it.  
B. Interpretation & Discourse 
1. Doctrine  
 Attempts have been made to codify this balancing test to address the uncertainty in both 
the international law arena and the DoD as it relates to the cyberspace domain. The Tallin Manu-
al, Rule 113—a publication produced by a group of international law experts and considered in-
fluential to international law—provides that “a cyber-attack that may be expected to cause inci-
dental damage incidental to the loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, 
or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated is prohibited.”  This rule mirrors the principle of proportionality provid134 -
ed by Article 51 of Additional Protocol I, but addresses concerns that cyber-attacks may be con-
ducted over civilian networks, which may cause excessive collateral damage to them. Collateral 
damage is defined as not only the initial impact, but also the second and third-order effects.   135
 See Solis, supra note 126, at 295-305. 132
 TALLINN MAN. 2.0 ON THE INT’L LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE, supra note 9, at 474, 478 n. 1144 (pro133 -
viding an example of the Galic Judgement, stating: “[i]n determining whether an attack was proportionate, it is nec-
essary to examine whether a reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making 
reasonable use of the information available to him or here, could have expected excessive civilian casualties to result 
from the attack.”). 
  See id., at Rule 113 (emphasis added).134
 Id. (emphasis added); See also Additional Protocol, supra note 7, at art. 51(5)(b). 135
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Like Article 51, the military advantage cannot be merely speculative, it must be reason-
ably foreseeable that it will contribute to the overall military campaign.  Reasonableness is 136
judged by the analysis consisting of those first-order effects (direct consequences of a targeting 
action, unaltered by intervening events) and those second and third-ordered effects (conse-
quences which are delayed, altered, or intervening due to the first-order effects).  For example, 137
the use of a certain malicious software during an attack may be uncontainable, or—as demon-
strated in this article’s hypothetical—an AI and ML platform could make decision to execute an 
attack in ways not foreseen by a commander. Conducting this analysis shows the difference and 
difficulty as compared with a traditional analysis, because in a traditional sense, the second and 
third-order effects may be rare or clearly identified. 
 The DoD Manual attempts to address the issue of proportionality in cyberspace by first 
providing that the proportionality rule applies to cyberspace.  It stresses the importance of a 138
commander analyzing the potential effects that are remotely removed from the targeting, as well 
as the “lesser forms of harm” such as inconveniences and disruptions to civilian network in-
frastructure.  The same feasible precautions and subjective balancing test in a traditional sense, 139
are extended for purposes of cyber-attacks.  The DoD Manual appears to do the most work by 140
what it does not consider excessive damage; that being, minor disruptions of services or internet 
services, brief disruption or interference with communications, or even defacing a webpage.  141
Thus, it is a helpful guide for application of proportionality for targeting in this domain. 
 Lastly, international organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, have 
put limitations on the use of cyber weapons employed in the cyber-persona domain (information 
operations) by providing that operations which “use information resources without relevant 
 Additional Protocol, supra note 7, at art. 51(5)(b). 136
 See TALLINN MAN. 2.0 ON THE INT’L LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE, supra note 9, at 472. 137
 DOD LAW OF WAR MAN., supra note 8, at 1022. 138
 Id. at 1021. 139
 Id. 140
 Id. at 1022. 141
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rights or in violations of the existing rules and laws of states or norms of international law[.]”  142
This is important given that key signatories (Russia, China, and other four former Soviet states) 
of this organization consider information operations, by definition, part of the overall cyber do-
main operating environment.  This captures a broad scope of activities that could possibly be 143
interpreted as excessive (subject to cultural and political norms of the nation-state). One could 
infer the purpose of capturing broad scopes of cyber-persona activity is meant to quell political 
dissidents from these nation-states.  Whatever the case, this rule would mean that information 144
operations as part of the cyber-persona layer of the cyber domain, are subject to the same re-
quirements of proportionality.  
2. Selected Academia 
 Attempts at defining the rule and applying it to the cyber domain have also been preva-
lent in academia.  Due to the terms used in the proportionality rule and the lack of doctrinal 145
guidance, academic discourse has made attempts to define the terms, call attention to its applica-
tion to the cyber domain and advanced technologies, and create workable standards and solutions 
for the rule’s application.   146
 Professor Gary Solis, in his second edition of Law of Armed Conflict: International Hu-
manitarian Law,  discusses the principle of proportionality—generally—and offers his insight. 147
He notes that “excessiveness” is an unclear but elastic concept that is left to legal 
interpretation.  Violations, he provides, have to be “clearly” disproportionate to the military 148
 AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE SHANGHAI 142
COOPERATION ORGANIZATION ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION SECURITY, 61ST 
PLENARY MEETING at 210 (Dec. 2, 2008) [hereinafter SHANGHAI COOPERATION AGREEMENT]; see also JOINT PUB. 
3-12, supra note 90, at I-2 to I-5.
 SHANGHAI COOPERATION AGREEMENT, supra note 142, at 209 (‘“Information war’ [-] confrontation between two 143
or more states in the information space aimed at damaging information systems, processes and resources…”). (“’In-
formation infrastructure’ [- array] of technical means and systems to generate, transform, transfer, use and store in-
formation [.]”) (“’Information space’ [-] field activities related to generating, transforming, transferring, using and 
storing information which influences….information infrastructure [.]”). 
 Hensey A. Fenton III, Proportionality And Its Applicability In The Realm Of Cyber-Attacks, 29 DUKE JOURNAL 144
OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW 335, 342 (2019).  
 See, e.g., Solis, supra note 126; Michael Schmitt, Law of Cyber Warfare: Quo Vadis? 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 145
264 (2014); See also Pascucci, supra note 120; see also Bathaee, supra note 104. 
 Id.146
 See Solis, supra note 126.147
 Id. at 294. 148
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object to be achieved; close calls don’t count.  This may be due to the recognition by the rule’s 149
commentary that civilian objects that are verifiably used by military forces (dual-use rule) can be 
attacked.  In such instance, the proportionality rule kicks-in as customary law that cannot be 150
ignored, requiring balancing of those potential civilian casualties and damages, methods used to 
attack such a target (access to intelligence estimates, battlefield information, and weaponeering), 
and a non-negligible decision that accepts unnecessary loss and damage.    151
 Professor Solis further explains that this proportionality analysis avoids actions that are 
“clearly” disproportionate and excessive by not merely engaging in an exercise of collateral 
damage estimates.  Indeed, collateral damage estimates have become somewhat of a trendy eu152 -
phemism for proportionality analysis, which is incorrect.   Although useful for a proportionality 153
analysis in providing data on expected civilian casualties and resources, the estimate does not do 
the work that proportionality analysis requires. Instead, pulling all available information and 
weighing it against the military mission’s end-state is the requirement.  This requires good-154
faith efforts in looking at the data and a reasonable decision that does not intentionally aim to 
harm civilians, but one that an outside observer could see a targeting ends to the targeting’s 
means.   155
 Professor Michael Schmitt in his article, Law of Cyber Warfare: Quo Vadis?,  provides 156
that proportionality analysis depends on what an “object” or “damage” entails.  He goes on the 157
to note that commentary—provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross—to the 
proportionality principle interprets “object” as something visible and tangible.   Data doesn’t fit 158
neatly into something that is visible and tangible, but it can be represented in electronic docu-
 Id. at 294-5.149
 Id. (dual-use refers to an object that is used for civilian and military purposes.)150
 Id. at 295 n. 160 (quoting Prosecutor v. Kupreskic and Others, IT-95-16-T (2000)).151
 Id. at 294. 152
 Id. at 295.153
 Id. at 303.154
 Id. at 295. 155
 See Schmitt, Law of Cyber Warfare, supra note 145, at 297-99. 156
 Id. 157
 Id. at 297 (“The [ICR] commentary to the [Additional Protocols] describes an object as something that is ‘visible 158
and tangible.’”) (emphasis omitted). 
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ments or storage formats.  For example, medical data represented by zeros and ones in comput159 -
er coding are codified in electronic word documents that can be printed into something tangible 
and visible. If the electronic system is destroyed, so goes the potential tangible and visible repre-
sentation. The commentary interprets “damage” to include diminishing significance of physical 
infrastructures that hold data.  This may be a judgement on the pre and post attack value of a 160
target. Following this logic, an attack that excessively damages this data without a clear military 
objective may violate the principle. 
 This is not meant to promote overreach, as Professor Schmitt warns, many of these forms 
of damage are appropriately categorized as information operations and use the layers of the cyber 
domain as a means to an end; data can be manipulated, but not destroyed to achieve the military 
purpose.  Outside of attacks on a larger internet or other communication network that would 161
excessive damage in the form of diminishing significance—partly due to the loss of functionali-
ty, it is doubtful that this view of “diminishing” value test would receive extensive consideration 
as a stringent rule.  
 Commander Pascucci, in his article, Distinction and Proportionality in Cyberwar: Virtual 
Problems with a Real World Solution,  concludes that clarity is needed from an international 162
doctrine to provide guidance in facilitating assessment of direct and indirect effects an attack in 
cyberspace may have.  He also argues that—currently—data is not a pure object, it can be cor163 -
rupted or manipulated, but that does not equate to destruction according to modern 
interpretation.  Only the underlying physical system is prone to destruction because attacks 164
signify an “act of violence against an adversary.”  But can this also include data? Does it in165 -
clude the loss of functionality? This question is best understood from the point of view that the 
 Id.  159
 Id.  160
 Id. 161
 See Pascucci, supra note 120. 162
 See id. at 447-48 (“Determining which of [these] effects constitutes ‘damage’ for the purpose of [international 163
humanitarian law] is a necessary predicate to ascertaining whether an injury or damage is excessive in relation to the 
direct and concrete military advantage anticipated.”). 
  Id. (Presently, a reasonable interpretation of international humanitarian law would cause a commander to select 164
a cyber-attack that may result in collateral damage destroying terabytes of data…over a kinetic strike that is expect-
ed to result in…civilian casualties.”). 
 Id. at 442. 165
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“knock-on” effects of a cyber-attack on information or an infrastructure can have “knock-off” 
effects that flow from them that need to be considered.  The primary concern being that those 166
initial “knock-on” effects will have unexpected “knock-off” effects that were not intended.  
Clarity in terms will assists with the ex-ante proportionality analysis of expected casual-
ties and damage which will be subjected to ex post facto judgement regarding a commander’s 
decision to attack a target in the cyber domain.  Indeed, the technology makes it difficult to de167 -
velop a methodology for such an analysis. If clarity can be given to what “effects” constitute ex-
cessive damage, decision-makers can perform a proportionality analysis as they did before in a 
kinetic sense with a clear understanding of the expected damage and its potential excessiveness 
considering the direct and concrete military mission.   168
In his other article, Uncertainty in the Law of Targeting: Towards a Cognitive Frame-
work,  Professor Schmitt introduces a mental formulae that could potentially capture the analy169 -
sis of effects, damages, and expectations thereof in terms of proportionality.  He introduces this 170
framework not to replace the subjective judgment of commanders, but to promote a critical 
analysis that pushes decisions beyond being “certain enough” about the effects and military ad-
vantage a target might produce in the face of battlefield uncertainty and ambiguity.  The 171
framework works in a mathematical expression by taking the value of each civilian or civilian 
object and the probability of collateral damage to each, eventually reflected in a total denoting 
sum of all collateral damage that needs to be considered.   172
 Professor Schmitt highlights a formula is needed because there is concern that the princi-
ple “allows for a fairly broad margin of judgement.”  Within the judgement is an assessment of 173
 Id. at 449-451. 166
 Id. at 446 (“The principle of proportionality is an ex ante analysis, rendering ex post facto consequences [.]”) 167
(emphasis omitted). 
 Id. at 451-52.168
 See Michael Schmitt, Uncertainty in the Law of Targeting: Towards a Cognitive Framework, 10 HARV. NAT’L 169
SEC. J. 148 (2019).
 Id. at 152 (“[This] article offers a cognitive framework for thinking about the confluence of uncertainty and the 170
[IHL] rules governing targeting.”). 
 Id. at 167-8. 171
 Id. at 173. The article displays this formula as: Σ [VCIV · PCD] (Σ= total collateral damage concerns [VCIV= val172 -
ue attributed to each civilian or civilian object · PCD= probability of collateral damage to each civilian or civilian 
object].  
 Id. 173
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many factors; among others, location, terrain, nature of the object, and impacts it will have once 
destroyed.  The factors eventually boil down to an assessment of foreseeable collateral 174
damage.  As discussed above, this foreseeable analysis must be done in good-faith, thus the 175
formula may provide discipline in the analysis.  He notes that the impacts of data loss and inter-
operability would still be difficult for value assignment, but at minimum, the formula may allow 
a commander to attribute value to effects such as death or injury that flow from such data loss 
and interoperability.  176
  Lastly, although not dealing specifically with the LOAC, Yavar Bathaee, in his article, 
The Artificial Intelligence Black Box And The Failure Of Intent And Causation,  provides that 177
many legal definitions and rules that are applicable to humans may be extremely difficult to ap-
ply to AI and ML; since “[m]achines and computers have no intent.”  This is due to legal defin178 -
itions and rules’ reliance on elements such as the actor’s state of mind (scienter or mens rea).  179
This is applicable in terms of this article because without understanding the Black Box of AI and 
ML and the results that follow its employment, a commander may have an inability to reasonably 
make a decision regarding expected damage and its contribution to a direct and concrete military 
mission. As mentioned above, a commander must weigh all available information and make a 
good-faith decisions based upon it.  As Mr. Bathaee explains, intent requires scienter; the scien180 -
ter of intent—here, reasonableness regarding expected damage and contribution to a direct and 
concrete military mission—may not be established on this premise of misunderstanding.  This 181
 Id. at 168-69. 174
 Id. 175
 Id. at 173. 176
 See Bathaee, supra note 104.177
 Id.178
 Id. at 906 (“Intent tests appear throughout the law and have developed over centuries to help courts and juries 179
understand and regulate human conduct.”).  
 See Solis, supra note 126, at 303.180
 See Bathaee, supra note 104, at 912.181
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could subject a commander to discipline if she decides to employ a weapon system without the 
appropriate ex ante analysis required.  182
 In his article, Mr. Bathaee uses the examples of an AI and ML platform used in the finan-
cial market. The platform executes a campaign to make profit from its owners.  The platform 183
was programmed to devise a profitable strategy for trading equities.  The platform blends ele184 -
ments of social media, spoof-trading, and legitimate purchases to drive up the price of its shares 
by using those separating lines in gradients of data.  The value rises and crashes, however, the 185
AI has made its move beforehand based on its aggregate actions and has made a profit. The de-
signer who programmed the platform to devise a profitable strategy is charged with a number of 
financial crimes, which require proof of criminal intent.  Mr. Bathaee argues that intent could 186
not be proven because the designer did not have that specific criminal intent which was involved 
when designing the AI and uploading data samples for the ML process.  The platform made 187
these tactical decision to execute its overall strategic goal. Even if reverse engineering where to 
occur, the opaqueness of which separating lines within gradients of data are used is highly un-
likely to be seen or understood by investigators.  
 Like Mr. Bathaee’s example, the intent element in proportionality requires a belief that a 
result would follow a decision based on available data.  If there is no understanding as to the 188
expected result due to a platform’s technological sophistication, again, the ex ante analysis can-
not prove that it was conducted responsibly.  Therefore, the good-faith intent might not be sat189 -
isfied.  
 See e.g., DoD 2311.01E (2014) at ¶ 4.4 (“All reportable incidents [alleged violations of international or domestic 182
law]…are to be reported promptly, investigated thoroughly, and, where appropriate, remedied by corrective 
action.”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (a) (2006) (“Whoever, whether inside or outside the United States, commits a 
war crime, in any of the circumstances…shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for life or any term of years, or 
both, and if death results to the victim, shall also be subject to the penalty of death.”). 
 See Bathaee, supra note 104, at 911-12.183
 Id.184
 Id. 185
 Id. 186
 Id. at 913 (“The only intent we can examine is the designer’s, and there is no intent that the designer intended 187
that the [AI] engage in [a] particular strategy.”). 
 See Additional Protocol, supra note 7, at art. 51(5)(b).188
 See Solis, supra note 104, at 303 (discussing the all available information test). 189
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 What can be gathered from academic discourse is that a certain level of leeway is given 
to commanders in their proportionality analysis. Only clear violations based upon all information 
available will be second-guessed. This process of evaluating all information is difficult because 
legal definitions and use of terms is unsettled by doctrine. The underlying functionality of a data 
infrastructure may be a starting point to consider in proportionality analysis’s casualty and dam-
age assessment, especially if tied to the initial impact on the infrastructure.  Development of 
more (interdisciplinary) cognitive frameworks may be helpful. However, an appropriate assess-
ment may not be possible given the opaqueness of the technology used. This may impact any 
good-faith assumption about whether a decision contributes to a concrete and direct end goal—
this is a  flaw in this legal system because these assumptions are based upon intent, the ultimate 
arbitrator of accountability for military action.   190
C.  Application   
1. Past Practice 
QC, AI, and ML will change proportionality analysis because it may interfere with the 
subjective test required by commanders, as well as result in excessive damages that appear to 
cross the threshold under the interpretations noted above. Indeed, those brief interruptions of 
network services, etc. do not violate the principle, but a permanent loss of an entire national-
economy based upon the uninformed actions of one commander, and an inability of an adversary 
to begin recovering from the effects on civilian infrastructure, may do so.  This conclusion can 
may be shown through past practice.  
For example, in 2007, Estonia suffered an intense “distributive denial of service” (DDoS) 
attack, an attack designed to swarm and overrun internet traffic on servers resulting in a shut-
down, in response to the county’s efforts to remove a Soviet-era World War II memorial.  The 191
attack resulted in massive delays and inoperability of large sectors of the economy.  Although 192
widely disruptive and annoying, this was not considered a violation of international law in terms 
 Id. at 303. 190
 Emily Tamkin, 10 Years After the Landmark Attack on Estonia, Is the World Better Prepared for Cyber Threats?, 191
Foreign Policy, Apr. 27, 2017, https://www.foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/27/10-years-after-the-landmark-attack-on-
estonia-is-the-world-better-prepared-for-cyber-threats/.
 Id. 192
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of proportionality; because first, the Estonian government considered the attack an act of terror-
ism,  and second, the attacks did not amount to an “attack” because no kinetic damage resulted 193
that would allow an analysis of the first-order or second-order effects.  194
In 2008-2009, Georgia suffered a blend of cyber-attacks and traditional kinetic operations 
when “Denial of Service” (Dos) and DDoS attacks were aimed at the country’s president and 
government websites.  These events were coordinated to occur at the same time Russian forces 195
were engaged in ground combat with Georgian forces.  The attacks were aimed at shaping pub196 -
lic opinion through information operations which promoted Russian narratives and vandalized 
government websites.  Notwithstanding the jus ad bellum issue as to the appropriateness of 197
Russian forces invading a neighbor’s country, this instance is not considered a violation of in-
ternational law when analyzed with a cyber perspective of proportionality.  Indeed, there exist198 -
ed a traditional military kinetic operation, but the cyberspace actions are to be examined sepa-
rately to determine their nature under the proportionality rule. The facts were too vague to con-
clude attribution to the Russian government and the cyber actions’ impact on the country, via the 
first-order and second-order effects that would constitute a prerequisite “attack” for a proportion-
ality analysis, temporary stops in services and defacing of websites, was not enough.   199
In 2009, the country of Kyrgyzstan had two main servers come under a DoS attack that 
shut down websites and email within the country.   The DoS attacks were traced back to Rus200 -
sia, and coincidentally occurred during the time Russia was pressuring Kyrgyzstan to stop its 
support of U.S. airbases in the country for U.S. use in its Afghan campaign.  Attribution could 201
 Carl Fitz, All Is Fair In Love And CyberWar: International Law and Cyber-Attacks, HOUS. J. INT’L L. SIDEBAR 193
(2017), http://www.hjil.org/wp-content/uploads/Fitz-FINAL-1.pdf. 
 Id. at 8-10. 194
 William C. Ashmore, Impact of Alleged Russian Cyber Attacks, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED OF ADVANCED MILITARY 195
STUDIES, UNITED STATES ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE 11 (2008-09), https://nsarchive2.gwu.e-
du//NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-027.pdf. 
 Id. 196
 Id. 197
 Eneken Tikk et al., Cyber Attacks Against Georgia: Legal Lessons Identified, COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE 198
CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE, 18-19 (Nov. 2008), http://www.ismlab.usf.edu/isec/files/Georgia-Cyber-Attack-NATO-
Aug-2008.pdf. 
 Id. 199
 See Ashmore, supra note 195, at 13. 200
 Id. 201
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not be proven, and again, the impacts amounted to mere annoyances and temporary shutdowns—
far below the first-order and second-order effects needed to analyze proportionality.  
In 2010, there was the discovery of a malicious code dubbed Stuxnet.  This presented 202
the one of the first instances of physical damage related to a cyber campaign.  The attack, 203
which targeted Iranian nuclear facilities through its Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) system, resulted in physical infrastructure loss of functionality—again, with physical 
damage—and a spread of the code to other parts of the country and around the globe.  Al204 -
though the loss of functionality may have been the intent and goal of whomever used the code to 
attack Iran, it was most-likely not intended for the code to spread to other areas around the globe 
and damage others’ data infrastructure. This highlights the deleterious results from a lack of 
technological understanding as to how and why a platform or tool will execute a strategy in a 
particular way. In other words, the expected infections to others outside of the intended target 
cannot be valued against the mission because they are unknown considerations. This may have 
violated proportionality because the “knock-on” effects where not fully understood, as well as 
the later “knock-off” effects, in effect rendering proportionality analysis incomplete.   205
Lastly, from 2014 to the  present, we have  seen a string of cyber-related attacks and uses 
of advanced technologies as a means of operations for nation-states. The Ukrainian war on its 
eastern border displays forms of Russian state military doctrine of “hybrid warfare”—the use of 
information operations on the general public, electronic warfare, cyberwar, and other forms that 
impacts all layers of the cyber domain, as well as traditional kinetic operations.  The civilian 206
population not only suffers routine physical damage from the kinetic operations, but suffers the 
same fate as those in the Georgian, Estonia, and Kyrgyzstan.  So far, international law dis207 -
course has considered these actions within the “grey zone” in terms of jus ad bellum and jus in 
 See John Richardson, Stuxnet as Cyberwarfare: Applying the Law of War to the Virtual Battlefield, 29 J. MAR202 -
SHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 5 (2001).
 Id. at 5-7. 203
 Id.; see also P.W. Singer, Stuxnet and Its Hidden Lessons on the Ethics of Cyberweapons, 47 CASE W. RES. J. 204
INT’L. 79 (2015), 81-82.
 See Richardson, supra note 202, at 24-26.205
 See George Perkovich & Ariel E. Levitte, Understanding Cyber Conflict: 14 Analogies, Georgetown Univ. Press, 206
85-93 (2017), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/GUP_Perkovich_Levite_UnderstandingCyberConflict_Ch5.pdf.
 Id.  207
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bello because their relation to the legal margins of what constitutes a real hostility.  In isolation, 208
these attacks present the same form of annoyance, but prolonged loss of functionality and 
“knock-off” kinetic effects (including proximate cause civilian casualties that flow from this loss 
of functionality) may violate proportionality’s “excessiveness” and “expected damage” rule.   209
From these examples, it seems that physical damage fits into the classical proportionality 
test. New considerations may be needed within this grey-zone of legal interpretations to cope 
with extended or permanent loss of data and interoperability of systems, as well as harms to 
civilians and their property as a result. Moreover, whether such permanent loss of data and inter-
operability of systems can be accurately assessed from available battlefield information and un-
derstanding of weapon system employment.  
2. Hypothetical Revisited 
 In any of these situations, the introduction of QC would make it highly unlikely these vic-
tim-States would have suffered brief, non-permanent damage. The damage may not fully be ca-
pable of responsible prediction, leading to the expected damage outweighing the mission goal. If 
Estonia had continued to suffer the deprivation of its national economy for a prolonged period of 
time rather than minor annoyances; if Georgian citizens were unable to rely on government ser-
vices that provided health, safety, and utility services for months as a result to damaged govern-
ment websites; or if Kyrgyzstan government would have been unable to perform basic works on 
behalf of its citizens as an impact from server shutdowns, the analysis may yield a result different 
than the above real-world conclusions, which may violate the principle of proportionality.  210
 The implementation of the weapon system mentioned in the introductory hypothetical 
would cause these annoyances to become real second-order effects in the face of a weapon sys-
tem that continually thinks and predicts adversary movements faster and in a more capable man-
ner that is required to recover. The AI, ML, and QC tool would have trained on sets of data ana-
lyzing enemy behaviors and predicted their troubleshooting methodologies and identified un-
known vulnerabilities of the adversary system for purposes of meeting military strategic goals of 
 See, e.g., Michael Schmitt, Grey Zones in the International Law of Cyberspace, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1 208
(2017).
 See Additional Protocol, supra note 7, at art. 51(5)(b).209
 Id. 210
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the attack. This included the entire civilian communication infrastructure. The tool pulls from 
those gradients in data, analyzes the data through the many neurons and layers within its system, 
finds hidden patterns within the data, produces algorithms to accomplish its goal, and executes 
with a speed and tempo faster than modern computing methods can cope. Current encryption 
schemes and troubleshooting methods to break QC’s post-quantum encryption regimes will be of 
no use. Impacts and effects would potentially result in real civilian casualties and damage to in-
frastructure.  
  Recall that proportionality contains four elements: 1. there must be an attack; 2. an ex-
pected civilian loss of life, injury, or damage or a combination thereof; 3. a concrete and direct 
military advantage is anticipated for the action (attack); 4. the expected civilian loss of life, in-
jury, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, is excessive compared to such con-
crete and direct military advantage.  If a decision to conduct an operation fails to satisfy these 211
proportionality elements, the attack must be cancelled or postponed.  Pulling from the propor212 -
tionality analysis requirements, an attack must be present because the physical degrading of the 
communications system’s infrastructure occurs as a “knock-off” effect of the operation.  More213 -
over, there is an expectation that there would be at-least some form of damage to civilian objects, 
the damage is in the form of loss of functionality and physical degradation of the system. This 
loss of functionality would not initially be excessive because annoyances and short periods of 
disruptions, as well as losses to data are not considered excessive under current doctrine and un-
derstanding of the principle of proportionality. Lastly, a concrete and direct military advantage of 
stopping adversary command and control is present. This military advantage serves the purpose 
of striking the adversary’s critical vulnerability of efficient coordination between its forces.  
 One issue with the hypothetical lays within the fourth element, whether there is an 
expectation of excessiveness compared to the military advantage. In order to conclude that there 
wasn’t, the commander would have to make a reasonable and good-faith judgement as to its at-
 Id.. 211
 Id.212
 See supra Section I. B.213
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tack’s potential effects.  This is based on all available information at the time.  She may have 214 215
initially concluded there would only be minor annoyance of loss of functionality for purposes of 
disrupting enemy command and control movement, making this attack compliant with in-
ternational law.  The attack would stop where she wanted it to. She most likely did not expect 216
to capture a national economy, a result flowing from a misunderstanding of the weapon system’s 
inner AI, ML, and QC workings.  
 Although an argument exists that the result cannot be imparted on the commander 
because the weapon system’s AI made this strategic choice outside of the commander’s true in-
tent, it may not work in terms of the proportionality rule. The responsibility of accurately assess-
ing all data available would include the weapon system’s inner workings. If the commander did 
not understand the inner workings of the system, she could not truly make a reasonable decision 
based on all available data—those algorithms, separations in data, and gradients used for the sys-
tem’s decision-making process. This would also raise questions as to whether a good-faith deci-
sion was made, given the reality that expected results are uncertain, or whether a decision was 
mere guesswork.  
 Another issue is present in the level of excessiveness compared to the concrete and direct 
military advantage. If the civilian systems merely suffers loss of functionality for a short dura-
tion, the commander may still be in the clear given precedent found in this article’s examples and 
academic interpretations. However, if new computing methods such as QC extend this loss of 
functionality into perpetuity or a crumbling of the national economy and services, there may be 
an immediate paradigm shift as to the damage compared to the goal of stopping adversary coor-
dination. Without the inability to recover in the face of the computing (quantum) supremacy and 
battlefield singularity maintained by the commander and her weapon system, the damage could 
slowly creep into the realm of “clear” excessiveness.  
 On that note, the commander may have subjected herself to disciplinary liability by 
making an uninformed decision as to the reasonableness and good-faith of her decision.  Ac217 -
 DOD LAW OF WAR MAN., supra note 8, at § 5.3.214
 See Solis, supra note 126, at 303.215
 DOD LAW OF WAR MAN., supra note 8, at 1022.216
 See DoD 2311.01E, supra note 182; see also 18 U.S.C § 2241, supra note 182. 217
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cording to international law, the attack should have been cancelled or suspended, ex ante.  The 218
other result could be that this hypothetical is merely extensive in damage and that the comman-
der did all that she could; essentially, Black Box AI, QC, and ML execution is understood by 
none. This would shift the paradigm back to the discourse of uncertain responsibility, which that 
may be of no help to anyone. 
V. Normative Solutions 
        New impacts on proportionality may be managed through responsible organizational 
control of the decision-making process and criteria, based on available information. The above 
hypothetical and its results can be mitigated with a group of general normative principles. There 
are potentially many solutions available, for sake of brevity, this article provides the below. 
A. Understand the Technology, How it Works, and Why it Chooses Certain Actions to Ac-
complish Goals: “If you know, you know” 
 The information assessment standards of proportionality requires the party executing an 
attack to understand the inner workings of QC, AI, and ML.  They must understand what the 219
data sets consist of, understand the gradients and how they are used, how weight is assigned, and 
how they are measured within those layers’ neural networks.  Lastly, they must test the weapon 220
system to understand how the data is being used and where those opaque separation lines are be-
ing drawn to produce variables for execution.   221
 See Additional Protocol, supra note 7, at art. 57(a)(iii).218
 See supra Section IV.219
 Id.220
 See Bathaee, supra note 104, at 928-9.221
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B. Retain Effective Control of the Technology and its Ability to Choose Pathways of Ac-
tion to Accomplish Goals  
 Observe, orient, decide, act, and repeat.  This may be a rehashing of the “humans in-222
the-loop”  argument, but end-state decision making should never be delegated to a weapon sys223 -
tem by algorithm or any other method.  The potency of battlefield singularity that AI and ML 224
bring to a fight, as well as the computing (quantum) supremacy of QC, can produce deleterious 
results which are outside the control of human actors.  Attempts should be made to build within 225
algorithms specific goals to be accomplished, contain markers that signal when an attack should 
stop, and when a human’s intent has been accomplished. 
C. Ensure the Platform Uses Correct Data Sets for Training Before it is Employed and 
Deployed: “Appreciate, but don’t discriminate” 
 The weapon system will only execute on data-sets it has trained on.  It will make 226
tactical and strategic decisions based on pattern recognition and past practice.  Close attention 227
should be paid to military precedents, race, gender, types of infrastructure, and other sensitive 
data. This could prevent a system from making unintended decisions based on patterns derived 
from questionable training data sets.   228
 Referred to as the “OODA-Loop”, it is a decision matrix originally used and developed by Air Force Colonel 222
John Boyd for military professionals. It is now used by a variety of professional communities. See, e.g., Berndt 
Brehmer, The Dynamic OODA Loop: Amalgamating Boyd’s OODA Loop and the Cybernetic Approach to Command 
and Control: Assessments, Tools and Matrics, 10TH INTERNATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL RESEARCH AND 
TECHNOLOGY SYMPOSIUM THE FUTURE OF C2, DEPARTMENT OF WAR STUDIES, SWEDISH NATIONAL DEFENCE COL-
LEGE (2005), HTTP://WWW.DODCCRP.ORG/EVENTS/10TH_ICCRTS/CD/PAPERS/365.PDF (last visited April 11, 2019).
 See Alan L. Schuller, At the Crossroads of Control: The Intersection of Artificial Intelligence in Autonomous 223
Weapon Systems with International Humanitarian Law, 8 HARVARD NAT’L SEC. L.J. 379 (2017).
 Id. 224
 See Ashley Deeks, Noam Lubell & Daragh Murray, Machine Learning, Artificial Intelligence, and the Use of 225
Force By States, 10 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 1 (2019) (Discussing legal implications of badly produced algo-
rithms leading which may lead to an armed conflict due to such algorithms inability to contemplate legal implica-
tions of its actions).
 See Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City, 20 YALE J. L. & TECH 226
103, 113-14 (2018) (The use and creation of predictive algorithms constructed through analysis of large datasets that 
may reveal correlations between various features and desired or objectionable outcomes).
 Id.; see also Ali, Cybersecurity Support of Insider Threat Operations, supra note 72.227
 Id.; see also Ali, Cybersecurity Support of Insider Threat Operations, supra note 72, at n. 373 (citing State v. 228
Loomis, 881 N.W. 2d 749 (Wis. 2016); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Loomis v. Wisconsin, 
137 S. Ct. 1240 (2017) (No. 16-6387) (Challenge to use and access to discriminatory data used in recidivism analy-
sis of sentencing hearing).
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D. Create End-Goals that Promote Expected Results: “Inspect what you expect” 
 Goals for a weapon system should not be vague or open-ended.  They should be real, 229
achievable, and narrowly-tailored to meet the charged human’s intent. In fact, AI and the process 
of ML are generally considered at their best performance when goals and missions are narrowly 
tailored.  The process usually involves taking “x and [adding] AI.”  For example IBM’s Deep 230 231
Blue chess machine in chess or its Watson’s performance on the television show Jeopardy.  AI 232
and ML capabilities aren’t yet scalable to take on general intelligence problem sets—such as that 
of interpreting end goals.  This won’t be the case forever, especially considering the concept of 233
an AI superintelligence explosion, defined as the point in which AI surpasses humans in general 
intelligence.  For now, limited and narrowly-tailored goals should be the same behavior for 234
military strategy. Planned success at one level of warfare eventually influences success at all lev-
els of warfare.    235
E. Develop International Standards for Post-Quantum Encryption: “Defense wins cham-
pionships” 
 ” With that said, the inevitable arrival of QC and its uses in military operations should pro-
mote the development by military and civilian communities of post-quantum cryptology in the 
form of quantum resistant algorithms (QRAs) and quantum random-number generators 
(QRNGs).  QRAs are expressed in the form of quantum resistant algorithms that use difficult 236
math equations, and  QRNGs are expressed in the form of truly random numbers generated by 
naturally occurring randomness (think measurements of solar flares), that are useful enough to 
stall or prevent QC from disrupting whole infrastructures for tactical gains.  The National Insti237 -
 See Hague Convention (IV), supra note 106, at art. 23(e).229
 See also Ali, Cybersecurity Support of Insider Threat Operations, supra note 72, at n. 229. 230
 Kevin Kelly, The Three Breakthroughs That Have Finally Unleashed AI on The World, WIRED BUSINESS, (Oct. 231
27, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/10/future-of-artificial-intelligence/.
 See KASPAROV, supra note 5; MAX TEGMARK, LIFE 3.0: BEING HUMAN IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 232
78, 161, 259 (Penguin 2017). 
 See, e.g., NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGER, STRATEGIES (Oxford Univ. Press 2014). 233
 Id. 234
 See, e.g., U.S. MARINE CORPS, supra note 1, at 28-31. 235
 See Herman & Friedson, supra note 21, at 12. 236
 Id. 237
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tute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has begun this process, but projected timelines for 
market and capability confidence has the potential to be surpassed by the development of an op-
erational quantum computer.  More serious attention and effort must be given to this matter for 238
public, commercial, and government access.   239
 Another possible solution is the implementation of Lattice based cryptography.  Lattice 240
based cryptography uses constructions of algorithmic protocols used to build cryptology—the 
backbone of computer security systems—by relating their construction to proofs of very hard 
math problems.  This is sometimes referred to as “worst-case hardness.”  Lattices are spaced 241 242
grids of an evenly distributed, but infinite number of vectors.  Connecting these vectors results 243
in coordinates.  These coordinates can have multiple beginnings, interconnecting in an infinite 244
number of ways.  As related to QC and its ability to efficiently factor large integers, Lattice 245
present an infinite number of problems sets (coordinates) for a computing methodology (QC) 
which is at-least theoretically, finite.   246
 Essentially, these Lattice schemes are built with security resiliency in-mind. If Lattice cryp-
tology is used, it could present QC, even if using ML methodologies, with an efficiency factoring 
problem it cannot accomplish its computing goals in time for whatever goal its designer had at 
the time.  
F. Develop Consistent Legal Terminology and Framework: Clarity breeds confidence  
 The development of agreed upon legal terminology, even in the form of an “Additional Pro-
tocol IV”—as Commander Pascucci notes in his aforementioned article—could establish thresh-
 See LILY CHEN, ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COM. REPORT ON POST-QUAN238 -
TUM CRYPTOGRAPHY 6 (2016), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2016/NIST.IR.8105.pdf (last visited April 20, 
2019).
 See Herman & Friedson, supra note 21, at 12.239
 See DANIELE MICCIANCIO & ODED REGEV, LATTICE-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY, New York University (2009).240
 Id. at 2. 241
 Id. at 3. 242
 Joël Alwen, What is Lattice-Based Cryptography & Why Should You Care, MEDIUM (June 15, 2018), https://243
medium.com/cryptoblog/what-is-lattice-based-cryptography-why-should-you-care-dbf9957ab717.
 Id. 244
 Id. 245
 Id. 246
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olds for collateral damage and certainty of effects in the cyber domain.  This could also be ap247 -
plied to terminology that describes when a system is devoid of operability or when data erasure 
constitutes excessive damage. This could possibly be added to Professor Schmitt’s mathematical 
formula for proportionality.  This could also face resistance, as the elastic concept may be more 248
adept at addressing operational goals in a conflict—winning—but a more disciplined approach in 
providing clarity of terms may assist in accomplishing operational goals in a legally sufficient 
manner.  
VI. Conclusion  
 The proportionality principle is elastic and flexible. This elasticity and flexibility may not be 
adept at providing responsible and legal decision-making in the face of advanced technologies. 
These decisions demand reasonable and good-faith conclusions to be made based upon data. The 
use of AI, ML, and QC may not allow for this if there is no effective control or understanding as 
to why weapon-systems choose courses-of-action outside what is needed for a military mission. 
Nor is the standard met with mere guesswork as to the unpredictable and potentially excessive 
impacts to civilians and property. This can be remedied with appropriate levels of legal integrity 
and frameworks in the employment of this technology by looking to, and learning from, doctrine, 
past practice, academia, and current practice.  
 See Pascucci, supra note 120, at 456-7. 247
 See Schmitt, Law of Cyber Warfare, supra note 145, at 297-99.248
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APPENDIX I: Qubits 
!  
  
 This figure adopted from an online article by Abhishek Ghosh, IBM Brings Quantum 
Computing in the Cloud,  shows that quibits bring a different dimension to computing. The fig249 -
ure shows how a qubit can exist in each state (1 and 0) at the same time due to its encoding with-
in a physical property. The physical property is measured and gives a variable as a one or zero. 
The probability that it is a one or zero depends on where the data resides within the physical 
property at the time of measurement. For national security purposes, once measured, the qubit 
collapses as either a one or a zero; this would indicate someone or something is attempting to 
figure out what is within the qubit. The collapsing state is an indication of possible infiltration 
attempts by an adversary.  
 Entanglement and Discord offer their own protections such as processing information in 
parallel and protecting information from exposed noise and disruption. Just like that of superpo-
sition, the national security implications are evident.  
 Abhishek Ghosh, IBM Brings Quantum Computing in the Cloud, THE CUSTOMIZE WINDOWS (May 5, 2016), 249
https://thecustomizewindows.com/2016/05/ibm-brings-quantum-computing-cloud/.
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APPENDIX II: Artificial Intelligence Cycle 
!  
  
          The above figure adopted from an online presentation, Artificial Intelligence Knowledge 
Representation,  by Hillary Ross, demonstrates a basic framework for AI decision-making. An 250
AI platform perceives its environment, processes its perceptions of the environment, stores it as 
data, analyzes the data and plans the best course-of-action via programmed algorithms, and de-
cides on a method or tactic to accomplish the assigned goals. For purposes of this article’s dis-
cussion, an AI platform would have been the recipient of pre-programmed data sets and exam-
ples to assist it in this decision-making process of attacking enemy communication in-
frastructure. For instance, it may have been programmed with infrastructure penetration tactics 
and malicious codes to best exploit enemy system vulnerabilities. This process serves as a 
framework for executing QC. 
 Hillary Ross, Artificial Intelligence Knowledge Representation, Slide 6/18, SLIDEPLAYER (last modified 2016), 250
https://slideplayer.com/slide/8088670/.
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APPENDIX III: Machine Learning 
!  
The above figure adopted from the online article, Inside the Black Box: Understanding AI 
Decision-Making,  by Charles McLellan, demonstrates the myriad approaches to machine 251
learning. It is best understood that this process mimics the human brain by passing data through 
multiple interconnected neurons that process and weigh data for consideration. Each neuron may 
carry simple mathematical operations, but together, they can potentially generate algorithms 
based on patterns that are too opaque for humans to see. For example, the tool used in this arti-
cle’s example may have caught gaps and exploits unnoticed by the adversary’s infrastructure 
managers. It has also decided, based on these gaps and patterns, to keep exploiting the entire sys-
tem to prevent any troubleshooting. This process facilities and supports QC and, even if the ad-
versary had its own AI/ML defense systems, the ability to compute at a more powerful rate 
would render such defense system moot. 
 Charles McLellan, Inside the Black Box: Understanding AI Decision-Making, HOW TO IMPLEMENT AI AND MA251 -
CHINE LEARNING, ZDNET, Special Feature (December 1, 2016), https://www.zdnet.com/article/inside-the-black-box-
understanding-ai-decision-making/. 
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